Why the US Must Remain Engaged in the Middle East

Biden’s initial move was to withdraw US troops from the prolonged conflict in Afghanistan, emphasizing the need to focus on future challenges rather than past ones. However, since October 7, his administration has swiftly deployed aircraft carriers, missile defense systems, and other military resources to the region. This response has been prompted by escalating tensions, including violent clashes with Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, as well as the need to safeguard shipping routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, airstrikes have been conducted against Houthi targets in Yemen.

Concurrently, Biden is endeavoring to revitalize a significant diplomatic initiative aimed at fostering normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, while enhancing security assurances for Riyadh. This recent shift underscores the ongoing strategic importance of the Middle East in global affairs.

The idea that the Middle East is merely a distraction from more significant matters reflects the lingering impact of America’s post-9/11 military engagements rather than the intrinsic nature of the region itself. Throughout history, the Middle East has held strategic importance as the intersection of three continents. Recent reminders from groups like the Houthis highlight its pivotal role in controlling vital waterways that link Europe to Asia, bridging the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

Moreover, the region’s energy resources remain indispensable. Despite discussions about transitioning to greener energy sources, the Middle East’s vast reserves will continue to fuel the world for many years to come. Given its strategic significance and energy wealth, the Middle East cannot be overlooked by the US, even though the complexities of the region often lead to outcomes that are not aligned with American interests.

Iran, once a formidable empire, is actively seeking to reclaim its regional dominance, primarily by fostering proxies that extend its influence and retaliate against its adversaries. Additionally, Tehran is advancing its nuclear program, potentially using it as a shield for its assertive actions.

Various extremist groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, exploit governance failures to pursue their violent agendas. Unfortunately, the nations opposing these destabilizing entities have often lacked the strength or organization to counter them effectively. Without intervention, the Middle East poses a significant risk of exporting global problems such as catastrophic terrorism, energy market instability, and attacks on critical shipping routes.

The resurgence of great-power rivalry between the US and autocratic regimes like China and Russia, often cited as a reason for reducing American involvement in the Middle East, actually underscores the necessity for Washington to remain engaged in the region. Both Beijing and Moscow recognize the strategic importance of the Middle East and have been actively seeking to expand their influence there. For instance, China’s brokering of a quasi-détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran in early 2023 demonstrated its growing diplomatic presence in the region. Biden’s response, particularly his willingness to provide Saudi Arabia with greater defense guarantees, aims not only to limit China’s influence but also to bolster stability in a region marked by turmoil.

Biden’s diplomatic maneuver with Saudi Arabia was not solely aimed at confronting Beijing. It was also part of a broader initiative to promote stability in the volatile Middle East. The normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, representing the region’s economic and military powers respectively, would solidify a coalition committed to countering Iranian expansionism. Additionally, it would help ease longstanding Arab-Israeli disputes that have historically fueled polarization and radicalization in the region.

The US would undertake a parallel de-escalation strategy with Iran in the interim. Washington would loosen sanctions and otherwise lessen economic pressure on Tehran; Tehran would limit its uranium enrichment and prevent its proxies from killing US soldiers.

For a while, it appeared promising: National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan could write in the fall of 2023 that America was turning the region into “a place of connection rather than chaos.” Next was October 7. The violent reaction by Hamas against the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations constituted a danger to the group’s marginalization along with that of its Iranian sponsor. And it shed light on an area plagued by widespread unrest.

The incident also exposed the worsening situation on Israel’s northern border, where Hezbollah has gathered an estimated 150,000 rockets with assistance from Iran. It demonstrated how the Houthis had become a force capable of causing instability on a regional and even global scale thanks to Tehran’s backing. It broke the unspoken de-escalation agreement that Washington and Tehran had worked out. Thus, the attack threatened to ignite a whole area by unleashing an existential war between Israel and Hamas.

Fire has been exchanged across the border between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel is striking hard at Iranian personnel in Syria and Lebanon as well as Hamas and Hezbollah. Following more than 160 attacks on US military installations by Iranian proxies, which resulted in the deaths of three US soldiers last week, Washington has retaliated against those groups with sporadic, now more intense strikes. Early in January, the Islamic State launched a devastating bomb within Iran to enter the conflict; in retaliation, Tehran launched ballistic missile strikes into Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, the Houthis have shifted their focus from attacking Israel with drones and missiles in October to wreaking havoc in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

These Houthi attacks, which include drones, missiles, and high-seas hijackings, are not insignificant nor symbolic. They have seriously hampered the ability to navigate freely, which is a vital component of the unprecedented prosperity that humanity has seen since World War II. The cost of maritime insurance is rising. Ships are circumnavigating Africa instead of navigating the treacherous Red Sea. The Red Sea’s shipping traffic has decreased by much to 70%.

Reluctantly, the US retaliated by organizing a marine coalition to protect global shipping. Now, with assistance from the UK, it is employing bombs and missiles to strike Houthi targets inside of Yemen. When America’s latest Middle East war began on January 11, Biden said, “hostile actors to imperil freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most critical commercial routes.”

But why is America’s duty to safeguard navigational freedom? Indeed, in order to protect its own access to the oceans, the US has fought previous wars, including ones against Germany in 1917, the Barbary States in the early 19th century, and Britain in 1812. However, America isn’t the main destination of the oil that travels through Red Sea shipping channels these days. The attacks by the Houthis most directly affect trade between Europe and Asia. The answer is related to the demands of steering the world order and the anxiety that arises from the possibility of its collapse.

Since World War II, numerous US policy decisions have defied narrow economic logic. Their rationale lies in the broader benefits accrued when the world remains relatively peaceful, prosperous, and secure.

In simpler terms, the United States doesn’t desire a scenario where every nation solely guards its shipping against piracy and plunder. Such a setup fosters anarchy, stifles trade, fuels global rivalries, and leads the world into darkness. Similarly, the US isn’t keen on another major power assuming responsibility for securing the world’s sea lanes. This prospect, especially if undertaken by China, would undoubtedly wield influence at the expense of US interests.

conflict widens. Safeguarding troops and vessels strains America’s already overburdened missile-defense capabilities. Operations in Yemen deplete the stock of scarce Tomahawk missiles, while engagements in Iraq and Syria necessitate tapping into the limited inventory of precision-strike weapons. Naval deployments in the Middle East tie up aircraft carriers, missile-defense destroyers, and other maritime assets. Therefore, Biden aims to minimize America’s entanglement in the conflict.

In Yemen, the Defense Department is conducting a meticulously targeted campaign, striking more than a dozen sites last Saturday. Prior to the recent proxy attacks on US forces, the Pentagon responded selectively to militias targeting American troops in Iraq and Syria. There were concerns that retaliating more forcefully or targeting Iran directly could escalate tensions. However, the scope of the campaign has expanded. Over the weekend, the US targeted over 85 sites across seven locations in Iraq and Syria. Biden’s administration carefully signaled these actions, likely in an attempt to minimize Iranian casualties and deter Tehran’s escalation. Achieving the delicate balance of doing enough while avoiding excessive force is a challenging calibration to achieve.

The Houthis appear to relish their defiance against a superpower: Regardless of their genuine concern for the Palestinians, they have vowed to continue firing until the conflict in Gaza ceases. Their substantial and mobile arsenal of drones and missiles presents a significant challenge. Halting the resupply of arms from Iran proves daunting and perilous, exemplified by the recent tragic deaths of two Navy SEALs at sea. Moreover, it may not suffice if the Houthis are manufacturing their own essential weaponry within Yemen. While the US can inflict damage on the Houthis, as Biden has acknowledged, halting their attacks and mitigating their disruptive effects present additional challenges.

The greater concern is the escalation of a multifaceted conflict. Iran may not seek a full-scale confrontation with Washington, but it perceives benefits from a prolonged, simmering conflict that fragments the region, impedes Saudi-Israel normalization efforts, and potentially compels Biden to withdraw US troops from Iraq and Syria for their protection. Tehran may not actively encourage its allies to escalate, but it certainly doesn’t restrain them either. On January 19, Iranian-backed forces conducted a sophisticated missile strike on al-Asad airbase in Iraq, resulting in injuries to US personnel. Subsequently, a deadly drone attack in Jordan forced the US to respond more forcefully, prompting calls for strikes against Iran itself.

Additionally, the conflict may get worse along Israel’s northern border. Even though the US allegedly talked Israel out of carrying out a significant preemptive strike to disarm Hezbollah following October 7, the likelihood of an increase has not decreased. The people in the northern cities fear that Hezbollah will do to them what Hamas did to the south, and the Israeli government cannot allow a situation where these cities stay abandoned ghost towns. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has issued a warning: either Israel will withdraw those forces, or Hezbollah will withdraw its forces from the area bordering Israel.

Alternately, perhaps something strange will occur. This prospect materialized when Iran fired missiles into nuclear-armed Pakistan in an attempt to destroy an Iranian militant organization that was stationed there. Islamabad was compelled by this to destroy the Iranian hideouts of an anti-Pakistan group. There or somewhere else, a complex web of violent encounters could build up to a larger, less manageable conflict. The increasing eventualities are nearly too many to enumerate at this point.

Washington will still face difficulties in the Middle East even if such scenarios are avoided. The conflict in Gaza poses a risk of causing radicalization among Arab communities, potentially replenishing the ideological fuel needed by violent extremists.

 More concerningly, Iran is increasing its uranium enrichment and shortening the amount of time it would take to gather enough material for a nuclear bomb, maybe to a few days. If Washington didn’t have so many other issues to deal with, this would be making headlines, which is precisely why Iran has picked this moment to make a move.

Navigating a significant Middle Eastern crisis wasn’t the primary ambition of Biden’s presidency. However, his administration is striving to seize opportunities amidst the turmoil.

US officials aspire to employ a blend of interdiction, degradation, and global pressure to progressively impede the Houthis from disrupting Red Sea shipping, even in the face of sporadic attacks. Along Israel’s northern border, they aim for disengagement by persuading Hezbollah to withdraw sufficiently, alleviating the pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to resort to military action.

Washington is promoting a protracted cease-fire in Gaza in the meanwhile in an effort to reduce regional tensions and maybe pave the way for a grand deal in which rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel advances, the Gulf states reconstruct Gaza, and Israel agrees to the eventual creation of a Palestinian state. This would be comparable to the victory of Henry Kissinger during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the US’s tenacious diplomacy helped bring about peace between Israel and Egypt and helped reorganize the region.

This is not at all impossible to happen. Both Israel and Hamas require a cease-fire; the former needs one to free more of its prisoners and quell public unrest, while the latter needs one to prolong its existence. When the war is over, the Saudis can clearly be heard eager for normalization to begin. Spoilers are still abundant.

Nobody anticipates the establishment of a Palestinian state anytime soon, but a politically damaged Netanyahu, eager to energize his right-wing supporters, is openly dismissing the notion. By further destabilizing the area, violent groups ranging from Yemen to the Levant might reject US policy. The Middle East’s current course indicates more conflict and escalation rather than less. Navigating the crisis will need a great deal of talent and good fortune.

There will always be a demand for US involvement, no matter what. Desperate diplomacy to prevent another war between Israel and Hezbollah could be America’s prize for averting the first one between Hamas and Israel. The cornerstone of a more stable power balance in the region will be a stronger US commitment to defense of Saudi Arabia. And the Middle East will see a never-ending competition between Iran’s adversaries and nuclearizing nation in the years to come. Without American assistance, the latter coalition will undoubtedly falter.

The manner in which this president has managed Middle Eastern entanglements will be a significant factor in judging him. And he will probably leave his successor in charge of an area that is still too important and too unstable to abandon, whether he takes over in 2025 or 2029.